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ABSTRACT Autopoietic societies have produced three major images of civilization: the 
Greco-Roman, the Eurocentric Western, and the Settler Society type. The most important 
incarnation of the latter to date has been America. This article explores the deep-going 
differences between American and European ideas of civilization. It examines how the 
American kind of autopoietic civilization expresses itself in preternaturally distinctive 
conceptualizations of nature and freedom, life and death, order and chaos, city and 
ecumene. The article discusses the political and social implications of this.        
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 CIVILIZATION AND THE WEST 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States emerged as a world 
power. One of the steps that it took, to prepare itself for this role, was to embrace the idea 
of Western Civilization.
1
 For a time, it seemed as if this might serve as a postulate for 
America’s new global ambitions and responsibilities. Western Civilization was a grand, 
but vague, narrative—a philosophy of history of Greeks, Romans, Jews, Catholics, 
Protestants, Romantics, and Pragmatists. It drew widely on the seedbed cultures of the 
Eastern Mediterranean but owed much to the legacy of Charlemagne and his creation of a 
territorial European empire.
2
 From its Foundation, America was skeptical of Europe and 
its narratives. Europe was synonymous with persecution, despotism and terror. The 
notion of Western Civilization, though, convinced enough Americans that Europe was 
 3 
worth saving. It justified American entry, at enormous cost, into the First and Second 
World Wars.
3
  
The idea of Western Civilization found its eventual epitome in the Chicago-based 
publishing program organized by Robert Hutchins—Encyclopaedia Britannica’s Great 
Books series (1952- )—and in Western Civilization teaching programs in American 
higher education (Hutchins, 1936).
4
 Its influence was greatest during the First World War 
and the early years of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. However, when America got 
into trouble fighting an aimless war in Vietnam, the taste for Western Civilization soured. 
In the late 1960s the American intelligentsia turned decisively against the notion.
5
 The 
West became identified with decline, war, slavery, empire, exploitative globalization, 
suicidal pathology, ecological mayhem, spiritual crisis, techno-scientific domination, and 
much else that was untoward. More curiously, the West was now identified with 
America. In a head-spinning turn, American intellectuals embraced European 
philosophies and engaged in a cultural war against ‘Western’ (read: American) thinking, 
while Europe, the historic locus of the West, was excused its culpable history of tyranny.           
Despite the Eurocentric despair of the American intelligentsia, the West remained 
throughout all of this a buoyant geo-political symbol and reality. It represented the return 
of Europe from the civilizational catastrophe of totalitarianism. For a time the idea of a 
Western civilization and the policymaker’s vision of the geopolitical anti-totalitarian 
West of the post-1945 era coincided. By the 1970s anti-Americanism resurfaced in 
countries like Germany and began to drive the twin geo-political and civilizational 
conceptions of the West apart. But their temporary coincidence had already made a huge 
difference. After the Anglo-American defeat of Nazi Germany, they provided the 
conceptual umbrella under which Charlemagne’s Empire was rebuilt as the European 
Union—eliminating the fratricidal relations between France and Germany, and 
overcoming the temptations of totalitarianism. When, after prolonged entropy, the Soviet 
Union collapsed in 1989-1991, it became possible to incorporate a range of states on the 
Eastern margins of Europe into this project, exceeding even Charlemagne’s reach.  
America after 1945 was the guarantor of a re-born European civilization. 
Extraordinary numbers of Americans lost their lives in the First and Second World Wars 
to rescue Europe from fratricidal and totalitarian misery—400,000 in WWII alone.6 In the 
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post-war era, the primary burden for the defense of Europe was carried by the United 
States. The conjugation of American and Europe under the rubric of the West was a 
logical reflection of close trading, investment, and military ties after 1945. Yet, for all of 
this, America and Europe were an odd pairing. America may have been for Europe but it 
was not of Europe. Nothing in Charlemagne’s imagination would have prepared him for 
the New World, and much about the Old European World worried Americans, not least 
the black holes into which so much of Europe had fallen in the course of the twentieth 
century. America may have rescued Western civilization from totalitarian barbarism, but 
a persistent question remained whether America belonged to the West or whether it was 
simply the guarantor of the West? No matter how often policy makers might invoke the 
geo-political imperatives of the West, and no matter how real these were, many, if not 
most, Americans (including many, if not most, policy makers) saw the United States as 
an exceptional society. It was an exception to the corruptions of the world at large and in 
particular to the corruptions of Old Europe (‘Core Europe’), an indispensable part of any 
definition of the West.  
Throughout American history, Europe has always represented vice counter-posed 
to American virtue: the Old World to the New World, Old England to New England, 
Egyptian bondage to the Promised Land, despotism to liberty, indentured serfdom to 
yeoman farming, primogeniture to free-holding, manufacturing misery to agrarian Eden, 
big cities to small towns, decadence to purity, paternalism to self-help, cynicism to 
innocence, status to achievement, inertial crowds to expanding frontier, patrician 
capitalism to progressive industrialism, global markets to domestic markets, national 
protection to free trade, free trade to tariff barriers, empire to democracy, overseas empire 
to continental empire, landed empire to maritime empire, Catholicism to Protestantism, 
wage slavery to property owning, dogmatic truth to libertarian opinion, commercial 
speculation to producer rationality, laissez-faire to scientific management, trusts to 
laissez-faire, state socialism to welfare liberalism, bureaucratic collectivism to individual 
freedom, dictatorship to law, family capitalism to intellectual capitalism, the French 
Revolution to the American Revolution, terror to elections, early retirement to hard 
work—in short, entropy to high-energy order. 
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Sometimes American impatience with Europe expressed itself through 
isolationism and inward-looking nationalism. The notion that the U.S. is a spearhead of 
the West runs against the grain of much conservative and liberal sentiment in America.
7
 
American ideologists of widely varying stripes think that American virtue flourishes best 
in isolation, and that the West is tainted either with an unacceptable history of aggression 
and domination or else with an equally unacceptable history of secularization and 
nihilism.
8
 At the same time, exceptionalism sometimes is expressed through outward-
looking interventionism. Late twentieth-century neo-conservatives saw America as a 
force for the global spread of democracy. They rejected both liberal criticism of America 
as an unconscionable aggressor-dominator and the national-conservative preference for a 
less perforated society. Neo-conservative America was internationalist. Yet it still stood 
apart from most other nations. Notably it took issue with Europe’s reluctance to confront 
modern vertiginous despotism. 
For all of the unquestionable uniqueness of American society (‘only in America’), 
its exceptionalism paradoxically is not an exception. Indeed this exceptionalism 
increasingly has channelled itself through America’s strong elective affinities and 
alliances with other settler societies and its ‘special relationship’ with the United 
Kingdom. It is notable that the UK produced most of the modern settler societies—not 
least the United States itself. In interesting ways, America’s ambivalence towards Europe 
echoes the United Kingdom’s own ambivalence to the ‘European idea’ of Konrad 
Adenauer, Robert Schuman, and Jean Monnet—architects of post-1945 European 
integration. Winston Churchill’s careful depiction of Britain as both inside and outside of 
Europe epitomises this. In his famous speech in Zurich in 1946 Churchill urged the 
construction of a ‘United States of Europe’. Yet he did not see the United Kingdom as 
part of that project but rather its ‘friend and sponsor’.9 British exceptionalism in relation 
to Europe is not all that different from the exceptionalism of the United States. It 
ultimately rests on the peculiar social physics of Britain as a society that is the product of 
waves of invasion, conquest, and migration—from the Romans through the Danes, 
Saxons, Normans, Huguenots, Dutch, Jews, Caribbean Islanders, Africans, Pakistanis, 
Indians, not to mention the complex patterns of internal conquest and migration and 
circulation between the English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish.
10
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American exceptionalism is the greatest expression of the exceptionalism of the 
settler society cohort. This cluster of societies has a discrete character, and one that cuts 
across the East/West distinction. Indeed, among the most successful modern settler 
societies are Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. While ultra-Modern and often even 
quasi-Anglophone, the East Asian settler states are also indelibly Chinese. The 
exceptionalism of the settler societies makes sense of some things that otherwise are hard 
to explain—for example the very close ties of the United States to settler states like 
Israel, Taiwan, and Australia in spite of their relatively small size.
11
 Thus, while 
American policy makers spend vast sums on the defence of Europe, they spend vastly 
more per capita on defending the Israeli settler state.
12
  
The West is a fraught concept. Historically it derives from the geo-political 
division of the late Roman Empire into eastern and western zones. The West was also a 
symbol of civilized order during the anarchy and entropy of Europe’s Dark Age. Order 
meant in effect ‘a new Rome’. Unsurprisingly the architect of the first Europe, 
Charlemagne, went to Rome in order to be crowned Holy Roman Emperor by the Pope in 
800. Yet, while the constellations of Rome and Europe shared certain characteristics, 
Europe was no renaissance of Rome. Both had world ambitions. Both looked beyond the 
conventional social scale and geographic reach of commands and rules. Both had a strong 
impetus toward social self-organization. But the European model of autopoiesis was that 
of the Creator God. The Classical model in contrast invoked Nature’s God. The classical 
image of Nature’s God extended back as far as the pre-Socratic Greek idea of phusis. 
Classical Nature was a lively universe of forms built out of symmetries, proportions, 
scales and rhythms, and animated by a world spirit or pneuma. The European model, in 
contrast, drew heavily on the idea of genesis. Divine ‘origin’ rather than sacred ‘order’ 
was the most important characteristic of European or Western Nature.  
The implications of this have cast a long shadow. Self-organizing societies are 
mediated in one of two ways—either by orderly morphological patterns or by the 
explosive upsurge of genesis out of nothing and the return to incommensurable (dynastic, 
biblical, racial, national) sources. Three clusters of self-organizing societies have 
appeared in history to date—the ancient Greco-Roman, the Eurocentric Western, and the 
Anglo-American-Settler kinds.
13
  Each has relied on either pattern or genesis thinking. 
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For all of its pyrotechnic modernity, America turned out to be much closer in spirit to the 
autopoietics of Greco-Roman antiquity than Europe. America today harbors many weird 
ideologies—from Old Testament moralism to Hollywood liberalism. Bewildering 
varieties of apocalyptic and technocratic, libertarian and communitarian world views 
share the same public space. They can do so because their influence is small compared 
with the automata-like workings of constitutional balance and public order instituted by 
the America’s Deist Founders. What the Founders were after was a mimesis of Nature’s 
God. Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison pointedly invoked this phrase, as did 
Tom Paine. The European story was quite different. Whereas creationism became a 
durable but risible oddity in America, romanticism ended up as Europe’s all-consuming 
ideology and the crucible of race empires, totalitarianism, fascism, and terrorism 
(Murphy & Roberts, 2004). While Europe borrowed ideas of nature and form from the 
Classical world, from the ninth century onwards the Eurocentric West developed its own 
Faustian (Romanesque-Gothic-Baroque-Romantic) culture. In this culture, form gave 
way to infinity, and the yearning for infinity was fueled by a desire for negation. The 
Faustian world pioneered the equation of ‘being’ with ‘nothingness’. Its eros lusted after 
the null, the void, the zero—the oblivion (lethe) and the nihil (Nothing) that lay beyond 
the boundary of existence.
14
   
If plastic figures and well-bounded bodies defined Classical culture, a taste for the 
immeasurable and illimitable characterized the Faustian culture of Europe. While there 
are major overlaps between the Settler Society Cohort and the Eurocentric West, there is 
also an important difference between them. The former have been peculiarly resistant to 
the Faustian component of the Western makeup. Faustian impulses have influenced the 
settler societies. Their military, businessmen and intellectuals have been routinely 
touched by Faustian urges. They all have experienced bloody episodes of excess but 
nothing at all to compare with the awful thanatocratic history that extends from the holy 
war of the Crusades to the pan-national totalitarianism of Hitler. Settler societies, when 
tempted by extremism, have usually pulled back from the brink. They have managed for 
the most part to deflate the lure of Faustian storms with a love of grace, balance and 
equilibrium.
15
 They have been deft in deflating ‘storm and stress’—by turning Romantic 
nihilism into charming landscapes or Baroque grandiosity into mild rituals of state. In this 
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way, they have avoided the propensity of Faustian culture to turn self-regulating order 
into self-annihilating disorder—and high energy into obsessive death seeking.16  
 
FREEDOM AND ORDER 
If America and Europe are so different, why did the narrative of Western 
Civilization become popular in the American imagination at the time of the First World 
War and after the Second World War? One reason is that it addressed important questions 
about the nature of order and anarchy. American political thought traditionally has 
focused on questions of contingency: freedom, change, choice, hope, and opportunity. It 
is difficult to over-estimate just how strongly these resonate in the American imagination. 
But there are also fundamental aspects of the human condition that these themes do not 
address. Self-regulating order is one of these. The idea of autopoietic civilization explains 
how order is possible in societies that exhibit high levels of social or personal 
contingency.  
In certain respects it does not matter whether we are talking about the Greco-
Roman world, the Eurocentric West, or America and the Settler Cohort, the basic 
condition of order in a free society is the same. Freedom requires form. Without it, 
autopoietic (autonomous) societies collapse into chaos or nihilism. Contingency without 
order, choice without nature, opportunity without social physics, and freedom without 
design—all of these turn human energy into a shapeless waste. Yet order is also often 
confused with dictatorship, hierarchy or law-fixation. Such false order strangles human 
energies. It is as debilitating as nihilism but in the other direction. Overall, too little 
structure dissipates energy while too much structure squeezes the life out of energy. 
Either way the result is depression and entropy. Avoidance of entropy requires open 
social systems. These allow the import and export of social energies across system 
boundaries. But the freedom of traffic between systems becomes destructive unless these 
boundaries can also be maintained, ensuring systems have an identity. The ‘form 
dimension’ of social organization operates at a pre-linguistic level. In contrast the 
‘freedom dimension’ of social systems is overtly, and often loudly, linguistic in nature. It 
is articulated through explicit ideologies and claims to rights. 
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Americans have been very fertile in devising political ideologies: progressivism, 
populism, welfare-state liberalism, neo-conservatism, and post-modern liberalism among 
them. Most of these ideologies had their origins in American borrowings from European 
natural rights ideas. The dominant Lockean strand in American political thinking equates 
nature with rights. This applies even to ideologies that refuse the title liberal. In America, 
‘liberal’ has narrow as well as broad connotations. Voters sub-divide into the Big Three 
cohorts of liberals, moderates and conservatives—about a third each of the voting 
populace. Yet almost everyone uses the ‘language of rights’. Thus, American 
romanticism presents as antinomian liberalism or as libertarian conservatism while neo-
conservatives prefer Anglo-Scottish to French-Continental Enlightenment (Kristol, 1983; 
Novak, 1982). In the end most American ideologies are variations of the ‘grand 
American liberal tradition’ as Allan Bloom called it (1987: 334). Only genuine 
reactionaries (racists, xenophobes, misogynists) exempt themselves from this.  
The equation of nature with rights, however, presents a problem. It powerfully 
unites, but also confusingly conflates, pre-linguistic nature with the declaration of rights. 
This means that natural rights ideologies have only a limited efficacy. This becomes 
clearer when we begin to consider society from the standpoint not of ‘rights and liberties’ 
but of meaningful ‘order’.17 To be clear—let us assume natural rights as a given. Let us 
not enter into a quarrel with natural rights, as reactionaries do, but then let us also go one 
step further and ask: how does a society, with widely-dispersed ‘rights and liberties’, 
create order for itself? In other words, how does this society solve what Talcott Parsons 
(1902-1979) called ‘the problem of order’?18 How does it create a sacred canopy for 
itself—an ordering of things that gives coherence, pattern and meaning to human deeds 
(Berger, 1967)?  
Historically, American political ideologies had much to say about freedom but 
shied away from a protracted discussion of how social order is possible. And yet a deep 
impatience with the recurrent disorders of Europe underlay American thinking in general. 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, this gap could be papered over by saying 
that the disorders of Europe were the consequence of despotism and that freedom was the 
antidote to disorder. By that time, though, there had begun to appear a phenomenon that 
the category of despotism in the classic sense did not fully explain. By 1918 in Europe, 
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the Balkans, and European-controlled Africa, a series of holocausts had taken place. 
These went far beyond the bounds of normal political violence. In these holocausts, death 
had emerged as the end of politics, rather than just one of its means. Death’s rationale 
was no longer fear or submission, victory or conquest. Death’s justification instead had 
become death itself.  
The idea of civilization was a retort to this. ‘Western civilization’ promised to 
unite Americans and Europeans against ‘thantatism’. Yet European culture was a primary 
source of this lethal trend. Representatives of Europe’s civilization openly offered the gift 
of death to humankind. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger in 1926 infamously 
described Man as a being unto death (1980). No ancient philosopher could have made 
such a statement. But, as Nietzsche had observed, the Europeans had finally killed off the 
Platonic God of Nature. After centuries of ambivalence toward Classical culture, 
Europeans simply disowned the super-sensory realm of Ideas, Forms, Nature, and 
Beauty. What was really troubling about this was that the ‘death of God’ turned more or 
less instantly into the ‘God of death’ (Murphy & Roberts, 2004). This ‘new’ God had 
long been latent in Europe’s litany of negative theologies. But, in the totalitarian 
twentieth century, it now became an explicit force. The political theology of the Faustian 
God of negation, finally unchained from the constraint of Classical Nature, led Europeans 
into the pit of self-immolation. The God of Nihil was ‘the Nothing that horrifies man and 
displaces him from his usual dallying and evasions’. This was a God that called 
humankind ‘to recoil in terror of annihilation and to be horrified by devastation’. This 
was the Being that was Nothing—the Surplus that was Empty.19  
From its European crucible, the doctrine of Nihil spread to Islamist and Japanese 
fascists in the 1920s, 30s and 40s. But Americans, for the most part, were immune to it. 
Why this is so is an interesting question. Eager to explain away the catastrophe of 
Nazism, Heidegger pointed his finger at the God of metaphysics.
20
 Platonism was the 
cause of Europe’s disgrace. But holding a dead God responsible for European nihilism 
was intellectual dishonesty at its worst. If anything, the opposite was true. The God of 
Form, Nature and Beauty has habitually inspired resistance in societies corrupted by 
nihilistic disorder.
21
 America was able to resist the totalitarian plague because it was a 
metaphysical republic. In the settler societies of the New World, Classical Nature was 
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never repudiated. Intellectuals toyed with the idea of doing so, but outside the universities 
this was never accepted, and even inside the universities voices like Heidegger’s student 
Leo Strauss (who had fled Nazi Germany) could repeatedly assert that there is a Nature 
that is imperishable, that cannot be voided, nullified or negated, and that cannot be put 
into question.
22
 In America, the God of Nihil remained on trial. It had to answer to 
Nature’s God.  
Here we see the great opposition in modernity: between a nihilism that is self-
devouring and a classical nature that has no beginning and no end. On one side of the 
divide is the necroromanticism of the Faustian Creator God. On the other side is the God 
glimpsed in the unlethal truth (alētheia) of the ancient Greeks—in Nature’s implicit 
resistance to the necropolities of death. Even Locke and Hobbes, who reduced Nature to 
Natural Rights, agreed on this. Accordingly, a government that fails to protect its citizens 
or subjects from death, or that encourages movements of ‘thanatics’, violates the phusis 
on which the state is erected. To define the human being as a being unto death, or 
society’s work as producing the terror of annihilation, is to adopt the standpoint of the 
necropolis. Americans in the main found this repulsive. Instinctively, they asserted ‘life 
against death’.23 The best of their intellectuals warned of the appeal of the city of tombs. 
Lewis Mumford did so repeatedly.
24
 What Americans sensed was the radical 
deterioration of the capacity of some societies to assert order in the face of chaos. The 
very point of such an order was that it did not spiral down through a lack of energy or 
spirit into depression, de-moralisation, and death-fixation. In American terms, this might 
best be described as an order of liberty. This is a kind of freedom, like the freedom of a 
great dancer or a great athlete, which is expressed through grace, balance, and limit. 
 
NO GOING HOME 
Americans are familiar with the difficulty of creating an order of liberty. Such an 
order is a paradoxical hyphenation of two seemingly contrary things: contingency and 
necessity. Liberty is the political expression of contingency. The American world is filled 
with contingency. This world—modern through and through—is the product of rights. 
Rights or permissions don’t direct action but rather leave action to the choice of the 
individual. This is a social world where contingency and uncertainty are pervasive, and 
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choice and election are inescapable suppositions for action and conduct.
25
 American 
political ideologies venerate the ‘I can’ and the ‘we can’. But, in order that they ‘make 
sense’, contingent acts—free acts—have to be integrated into a larger whole. Otherwise 
such acts end up being arbitrary or absurd. St. Augustine described this as the universe 
constantly sliding towards the abyss of nothingness. Cumulatively, acts that are arbitrary 
or absurd portend chaos. Chaos is the antonym of order, and it is order that signifies 
meaning. Human beings create meaning by organizing contingent elements and actions 
into patterns and systems.  
For Americans, large-scale order is most visibly represented in the idea of a ‘new 
order of the ages’—the constitutional schema that the American Founders created. But 
underlying this is a still larger order of meaning. Religion is often used as a descriptor of 
this. Most Americans will tell you they believe in God. America is more conventionally 
religious and more church going than any other modern nation and most pre-modern 
ones. But this sociological fact is less important than the metaphysical sense that 
permeates American society. This metaphysics is roughly equivalent to what the ancient 
Greeks called phusis. Emerson offered the most characteristic American reading of 
phusis. He called it the choral harmony of the whole. Notably the most perceptive 
European observer of the Americans, Tocqueville, missed the centrality of phusis 
thinking to America. The United States is everything that Tocqueville said it was. It is 
restless, rootless, vulgar, enterprising, improving, levelling, and teeming. But it also has 
an enormous capacity to turn turbulent energy into visible order without hierarchies or 
rules. Emerson identified the medium for extracting temperate order out of restless chaos: 
‘Design. It is all design. It is all beauty. It is all astonishment.’26  
However such phusis is interpreted—whether it is understood as Nature, God, 
Beauty or Necessity—it is the intimation of something sacred. It is sacred not because it 
signifies a particular order of existence, but because it signifies the very existence of 
order. Alexander Pope put it beautifully: ‘Order is heaven’s first law’. Tom Paine spoke 
movingly of the ‘unerring order and universal harmony reigning throughout the whole’ of 
nature—through self, society, and cosmos. What is sacred about this order is the 
equilibrium at the heart of it. Such equilibrium has a social pay-off. It is the force that 
orchestrates the flow of energy between social actors, social parts, and social systems. 
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This flow stops or at least delays the onset of entropy. Balance thus secures negative 
entropy. When such order is torn asunder, we know that something terrible is at work. 
The opposite of order is chaos.  
When societies, states, and empires slide into chaos, the question of civilization is 
posed. When this began to happen near the turn of the twentieth century—notably in the 
Balkans in the 1890s, and then in the First World War—Americans asked themselves: 
can we (should we) do anything to avert it? There were two possible answers to this 
question. One said that the descent into the abyss was the product of the vices of the Old 
World, and Americans should leave well alone. The other said that America had a 
responsibility to mend and restore or replace the sacred canopy when it had been torn 
asunder. One response was isolationist; the other was internationalist. But either response 
required justification to the world. By the beginning of the twentieth century America had 
become large enough and powerful enough that it had to answer for its actions—or its 
inactions. The problem was: in what ‘language’ could it respond? Its home-grown 
ideologies were not much help to it. They were ‘domestic languages’—intelligible for 
local consumption. Foreigners found them opaque.  
The thing that is striking about America’s home-grown ideologies—the republic’s 
broad-spectrum of liberalisms—is that they have had little resonance outside of the 
United States. Where variants of European socialism spread around the world, virtually 
no American natural rights ideology found followers abroad. The American way of 
talking about the experience of contingency translated badly. The idea of a Herbert 
Croly-style German or Egyptian ‘progressive’ is virtually inconceivable.27 While 
European natural rights philosophies proved to be highly exportable, not least of all to the 
United States, their incarnation in the various strands of American political ideology 
defied re-export. This posed a number of problems for a new world power: not just for 
the communication of its influence to others, but also for explaining itself, orientating 
itself in the world, and understanding the nature of others with whom it had to deal.  
In 1955, the Harvard historian Louis Hartz (1919-1986) observed that liberalism 
had acquired a virtual stranglehold on the American mind. America’s ‘irrational 
Lockeanism’ had become ‘one of the most powerful absolutisms in the world’ (1955: 58, 
also 3-23, 58-60). Hartz noted that, as a result, America lacked a crucial combative 
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horizon—something against which natural rights nostrums must struggle if America was 
to gain an adequate understanding of itself and of others in the world. Hartz’s argument 
was that natural rights thinking had emerged in Europe in the modern age as an 
adversarial force in opposition to the thought of the ancien regime. In turn, natural rights 
doctrines had been strenuously challenged by feudal (‘tory’), socialist, and radical ideas. 
Hartz had the notion that a world-encompassing dialectic that might eventually provoke 
America into an intellectual engagement on a macro-historical scale. What caught Hartz’s 
attention were idea fragments that had lodged in various places in the New World—the 
rural Calvinism of the Dutch (Boers) in South Africa, the reformist ex-English socialists 
in Australia, and Catholic Aristotelianism in French Quebec and Latin America. He never 
fully articulated it but he seemed to hope for a conversation, or perhaps an argument, of 
American natural rights liberalism with the feudalisms, socialisms, and radicalisms of the 
New World (1964).  
At any rate, Hartz made a telling point: to answer the dilemmas of modern 
political life, America had to step outside of its own self. ‘Instead of recapturing our past, 
we have got to transcend it… There is no going home again for America’ (1955: 32). But 
if America could not ‘go home’, then where and how could it find the intellectual agon 
that it seemed to lack? Hartz’s reference to Catholic Aristotelianism appeared to give the 
most credible hint. This was not because it promised a re-run of the Catholic-Protestant 
divide that once had fired Europe. That agon was of another time and place. It had been 
convincingly extinguished in America by the natural rights doctrine that separated church 
and state, and guaranteed freedom of worship. Rather it was the case that Aristotelianism 
and Catholicism were as equally adept as Enlightenment natural rights ideas in 
translating across time and space. Like the Enlightenment, they had ‘no home’. In order 
for America not to go home, its natural rights tradition had to be paired with some 
powerful contrarian currents.  
The Chicago Encyclopaedists had similar intuitions. Certainly Robert Hutchins 
did. Hutchins’ legacy was two-fold. In the 1930s, during his tenure as President of the 
University of Chicago, Hutchins promoted the works of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Cardinal 
Newman as paradigm instances of the Great Books,
28
 and he encouraged around himself 
Neo-Aristotelians like Richard McKeon (1998-, 1990).
29
 Later, in 1941, Hutchins co-
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founded the Committee on Social Thought also at the University of Chicago.
30
 This 
founding was Hutchins’s greatest legacy. No intellectual centre in America ever attracted 
so many brilliant minds. Its early members included Leo Strauss (1949-1967), Saul 
Bellow (1962-1993), Hannah Arendt (1963-1967), and Friedrich Hayek (1950-1962).
31
 
For all of this, though, it was the Neo-Aristotelian experiment that was closer to 
Hutchins’ own desire to create the bridge between Europe and America represented by 
the Great Books tradition—the epitome of Western Civilization.   
Chicago Neo-Aristotelianism developed in parallel with Catholic Neo-
Thomism.
32
 Both understood that form was the necessary correlate of freedom, and that 
contingency required an encompassing order. Yet their understanding of this was 
curiously abstract. Both confused history with the history of reading texts. The orthodox 
Neo-Thomist account of Being is inseparable from ‘acts of interpretation’ of the Great 
Books of the Classical-Christian corpus.
33
 This is ironic given the traditional Catholic 
bias towards visual and audile culture. Neo-Thomism ended up mimicking the Hebraic-
Protestant passion for texts.
34
      
 
LIQUID GEOGRAPHY AND SACRED CANOPY 
Neo-Thomism and Neo-Aristotelianism were too bookish, and the counter-
Lockean currents of the New World were too distant or too antediluvian, to be more than 
curiosities to Americans.
35
 One interesting thing of lasting value that Hartz’s thesis about 
the New World did introduce, though, was the figure of geography. Hartz concluded that 
location was a determinant of political ideology. It mattered whether political ideologies 
came from Quebec or from New England, from the American Mid-West or from the 
American West. More important still than the specifics of Hartz’s work was his general 
approach. The reader of his classic work The Founding of New Societies is invited to look 
at history and politics through the lenses of space and geography. This is valuable 
because it helps us begin to answer the question of civilization (‘what is it?’) in ways that 
the Great Books approach cannot do and does not do.  
Space in the guise of geography is, and always has been, a major determinant of 
civilization. It conditions what civilization is and where it emerges. The question of 
civilization at its heart is a question about order and chaos. Certain geographies—that is 
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also to say certain arrangements of nature—tacitly cooperate in the creation of order. 
They become Nature’s—or the Cosmos’s—correlate of social order: an aid to the 
creation of social meaning and an impediment to its dissipation through entropy. Sea 
regions, littoral topographies, and the liquid geographies of rivers and coasts are 
particularly important in the creation of civilization. Liquid geographies are nature’s 
‘breath’ (pneuma). In the course of human history, these have been amongst the most 
important spaces of passage. They have been the spaces that have regulated the most 
intense comings and goings, giving and receiving, entries and exits of human beings.
36
   
This pneumatic circularity lies at the core of Being. The rhythm of being is 
inscribed in the nature of civilization. Social systems dissipate entropy or disorder, at 
least for a time, through the interactions (giving and receiving) between system and 
environment.
37
 ‘Breath’ or pneuma is a model or metaphor for an alternating, dyadic 
rhythm. This is nature in the sense of the Greek phusis. In so many of its aspects, 
civilization is an artifice. It is the work of human ingenuity and design. But this human 
ingenuity is always conditioned by nature. Nature aids design. ‘Obey nature’, advised the 
Stoics. In practice, autopoietic civilization does follow nature.  
One of the indubitable aspects of nature is space. From the standpoint of 
civilization, the most interesting kinds of spaces are those of passage and traffic, 
circulation and revolution. Such spaces exist only in the abstract—as pure potential—
until human beings make something of them: until, for example, the American pioneers 
crossed the Appalachian Mountains to settle in the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys—
blessed with the great river systems that connect the Great Lakes system with the 
Caribbean Sea. In doing so, these settlers, unconsciously, were enacting a ‘sacred’ space: 
one that had its own kind of implicit rhythmic order. This was a space where human 
beings acted in a mimesis of nature. It was the Sphinx of the American Revolution, 
Thomas Jefferson, who understood the macro-temporal and macro-spatial significance of 
this. After all, he purchased precisely this ‘geography of connection’ from the French. He 
saw it as a central to the creation of an ‘empire of liberty’ that would evade the chaos of 
European history: the chaos caused by Faustian despotism.  
Jefferson’s intuition was supported by precedent. For even across the Atlantic, the 
great examples of civilization were creations and creatures of liquid geographies: the 
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Mediterranean-Black Sea region and the North Sea-Baltic Sea region—and the fingers of 
the rivers that drained into them. From these littoral regions had arisen classical antiquity, 
the Renaissance, and the modern civic capitalism of North-West Europe. What had 
existed on the maritime periphery of Europe was multiplied in the case of North America. 
For Nature had blessed North America with a historically unprecedented series of sea and 
littoral regions suited to intensive commercial, civic, and intellectual transactions: the 
Eastern Seaboard (Boston, Philadelphia, Washington), the Hudson-Great Lakes’ region 
(New York City, Detroit, Toronto, Chicago), the Mississippi-Gulf-Floridian Peninsula 
region (St. Louis, New Orleans, Houston, Miami), the California Coast region (San 
Francisco, Los Angeles), and the Puget Sound region (Seattle, Portland, Vancouver).  
Those who like irony should relish the fact that world history is regional. It is the 
creation of littoral city regions with world reach—in exactly the sense that Venetian 
traders and bankers impacted economies and societies from the Baltic to the Silk Route. 
That America, by the beginning of the twentieth century, had become world historical is 
without question. What is more intriguing to observe is the foundation upon which 
America’s ascent to world history was achieved. It is interesting to compare America 
with Athens and Rome. These states launched themselves from one sea region (the 
Mediterranean) or in the case of the classical Greeks it is perhaps more accurate to say 
two sea regions: the Mediterranean and Black Seas—fighting over the command of the 
passage between those two seas provided the basis for Greek cycle of epic and tragedy 
rooted in the story of the Trojan war. The rise of American power and civilization was 
based not on one or even two but on at least five sea regions. (Six if we add the historic 
case of Canada’s Hudson Bay.) One of the things that make Thomas Jefferson great is 
that he had inklings of this. He intuited that America eventually would cross east and 
west and north and south from coast to coast.
38
   
Like many of his generation, Jefferson was schooled in classical history and 
philosophy (Murphy, 2001: 284-289). It is difficult for casual observers to appreciate the 
modernity of this. What gave Jefferson such an interesting view of macro-history is 
precisely that this was history not understood from the standpoint of territorial Europe but 
from the standpoint of the littoral. American models of government and civilization came 
from the maritime periphery: from the ancient and Renaissance Mediterranean, and from 
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the North Sea powers, the British and Dutch, and their notions of Commonwealth and 
Republic.
39
 Antiquity was especially productive for thinking about social models 
independent of the real-politick of the day.    
We find the sympathy that Jefferson and his Deist peers had for Classical 
archetypes resurrected in the twentieth century, especially amongst the brilliant cohort of 
thinkers concentrated around the Committee on Social Thought at the University of 
Chicago. This cohort did what Jefferson had done: they forged an astonishing and 
paradoxical world view of modernizing classicism. As in the case of Jefferson, this 
allowed them to take on board and yet at the same time qualify the instinctive natural 
rights ethos of America—to make of nature something more than inalienable rights. To 
do this required a philosophical history—or rather a philosophical geography—of 
America that was not dependent on the history and geography of Europe in 
Charlemagne’s sense.  
To play the classicist as Jefferson did might be thought a curiosity, yet it implied a 
skeptical nod toward a history and geography (the history and geography of Old Europe) 
that many, perhaps most, Americans saw themselves as being an exception to. Even 
Americans who were vociferously pro-Western in international policy had doubts about 
the catastrophes of the European past. The West seemed to them to be more like a burden 
to be carried than a model to be admired. The views of the latter-day Chicagoans, 
contemporaries of Louis Hartz, agreed with Hartz at least in this—that there could be ‘no 
going home again for America’. As we have seen, Hartz fished around the New World 
for agonistic partners for American liberalism, a strategy not without merit. Hartz 
intuitively identified civilization with settler societies. This was a brilliant intuition, but 
one that he never fully developed.  
The latter-day Chicagoans looked elsewhere—to the historic, multi-layered 
civilizational seedbed of the Eastern Mediterranean.
40
 There is an argument to be made 
that, already in antiquity, the Eastern Mediterranean was one of the principal historic 
progenitors of settler societies (Murphy, 2001:19-20). It laid down a template for all later 
settler states. In that sense, there was a tacit convergence of the latter-day Chicagoans and 
the Hartz thesis. But this convergence is only to be seen in hindsight. The Chicagoans 
explicit preoccupation was the Eastern Mediterranean—its philosophical, political, and 
 19 
religious history. This was a mirror against which North Americans could measure 
themselves and their role in the world. What the 1950s and 60s generation of Chicagoans 
proposed, in effect, was a dialogue between the shores of the Great Lakes and the 
ecumene of the Eastern Mediterranean. William McNeil (1964, 1974 & 1978) furnished a 
series of world historical studies of the terrain between the Crimea and Venice—spanning 
the Venetian and Ottoman Empires and Modern Greece. Leo Strauss defended classical 
nature, and questioned modern natural right. With a Socratic gesture, he ironized the 
American idea of the liberal—turning him into a Greek gentleman. Hannah Arendt 
sketched America’s debt to Greece and Rome (1963), and offered a non-Lockean account 
of the human condition (1958). In On Revolution, she presented the first great 
philosophical account of the difference between Europe and America. Friedrich Hayek 
famously defended Anglo-American self-organization against European centralism. 
English Old Whig ideas stood in for the Greeks in Hayek’s social philosophy. 
 
OPEN SYSTEMS 
Chicago was a prism for a powerful idea. This was the notion that American self-
understanding was best served by looking in the civilizational mirror of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Hannah Arendt exemplifies the prismatic quality of Chicago. She was the 
paradigmatic New York intellectual but her consummate work, The Human Condition, 
came out of the Walgreen Lectures she gave at the University of Chicago in 1956. The 
case of Eric Voegelin echoes this. Working away in that faded residue of former littoral 
power—Baton Rouge in Louisiana—he developed reflections ‘on the form of the 
American mind’41 into a long meditation on the species of order represented by the 
Mediterranean ecumene (1956-1987, 1989). The first mature statement of Voegelin’s 
philosophy, The New Science of Politics, was created during a short tenure at the 
University of Chicago, where he delivered the 1951 Walgreen Lectures.
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 Similarly, in 
Toronto in the early 1950s, Harold Innis’ mercurial studies of modern communications 
and empire drew heavily on comparisons with the Greco-Roman past.
43
 The prism of 
Chicago again was notable. Innis had completed his PhD at the University of Chicago.  
Chicago was not omnipresent. Lewis Mumford regarded the Greek polis as the 
measure of civilization but owed this view to a New York education and to the early 
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influence of Emerson, not to mid-Western Hellenism.
44
 Yet Saul Bellow was still right to 
note the peculiar power of Chicago over the life of the mind. The case of the Austrian 
expatriate Ludwig von Bertalanffy illustrates this perfectly. In 1937-1938, Bertalanffy 
gave his first lectures on General System Theory—at the University of Chicago.45 He was 
a little different, though, from most of the post-war Chicagoans. Bertalanffy was deeply 
influenced by the macro-historical thought of the 1920s and 1930s: Toynbee and 
Spengler. He wrote little on the triangulation of Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem. Yet his 
work—or rather his central thesis—is crucial to understanding why the Eastern 
Mediterranean rather than the West made good sense as a mirror for American self-
understanding of the nature of civilization.  
Bertalanffy introduced the notion of the open system (1968).  He coined the term 
for biology, and then applied it across the spectrum of natural and human sciences. 
Biological organisms, he noted, were systems of elements. Bertalanffy distinguished two 
kinds of systems. The first kind, the (traditionally conceived) physical system, does not 
exchange matter with its environment. The system is closed. Without the import and 
export of matter, the system gradually runs down or breaks down. Closed systems 
invariably suffer entropy. The fate of a closed system is disintegration and death. 
Organisms in contrast can evade entropy—at least up to a point—by importing and 
exporting matter. This is the definition of an open system: matter flows across the 
boundaries of the system. 
Bertalanffy applied his distinction between open and closed systems to many 
kinds of systems—including social systems. Indeed, in the case of social systems, the 
application is very apt. Most societies and states suffer from entropy at some time or 
other. Some suffer this more than others. In Bertalanffy’s own lifetime (1901-1972), this 
was spectacularly true of the Eurasian empires: the Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian, 
Ottoman, and Soviet Empires. Each ended in breakdown, disintegration, and dissolution. 
Sometimes the run-down of a social system expresses itself in crisis and the incapacity 
for reform. Other times entropy-death, manifest in the commission of unnatural crimes, 
becomes its very rationale for existence. The bleakness of traditional social suffering is 
exceeded by a new, infernal kind of suffering that beggars the imagination. We see the 
latter exemplified by the fratricide of Europe in the First World War, the Nazi death 
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camps, the Soviet Gulag (20 million dead), Idi Amin’s Ugandan dictatorship (1971-1979, 
300,000 dead), Pol Pot’s rule in Cambodia (1975-1979, 1.7 million murdered), Radovan 
Karadzic’s and Slobodan Miloševic’s genocide in ex-Yugoslavia (1991-1995, 430,000 
killed, 3 million displaced), the fratricidal Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988, 1 million killed) 
and the 35 years of Iraq’s Baathist necropolis (another quarter-to-a-half million dead and 
4 million exiled), or Africa’s civil wars at the millennium’s end: the Democratic Republic 
of Congo four decades on from 1960 and 2 million dead,
46
 a grisly book-ending of King 
Léopold II of Belgium’s late nineteenth-century heart of darkness where at least 5 million 
Congolese were killed.
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One of the reasons that America looked upon itself as an exceptional society was 
its sense of repulsion at the history of social entropy in Europe and elsewhere. In 1904, 
the African-American leader Booker T. Washington observed of King Léopold’s deeds: 
‘There was never anything in American slavery that could be compared to the barbarous 
conditions existing today in the Congo Free State.’ Robert Park—later to become the 
great Chicago School sociologist—campaigned with Washington against the Congolese 
killing field. In their public agitation through the Congo Reform Association, the pair 
paid homage to the opening paragraph of the American Declaration of Independence and 
its assertion of the inalienable right to life. Against the background of repeated crises of 
civilization in Europe and European-controlled societies, this was an affirmation of the 
universal law against murder and the slaughter of innocents. It was also an affirmation of 
the American metaphysics of order.  
Civilization is a synonym for puzzling about social entropy. American interest in 
this question picked up around the First World War. This was partly because of the great 
European fratricide—and the question of whether America should intervene to stop it. 
Partly, also, American interest was raised because of the emergence in the late nineteenth 
century of movements that had begun to employ terror not only as the means but also 
increasingly as the end of political action: these movements appear in different guises, 
again and again, from turn-of-the-century Russian Slavophiles and Balkan irredentist 
nationalist terrorists through the Stalinist wing of the Bolshevik Party to the Italian Red 
Brigades and the German Baider-Meinhoff Gang in the 1970s to Islamist terrorists in the 
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1990s and 2000s with their mix of fascist ideology, anti-Semitism, and lurid pan-
nationalist fantasies. 
Thanatocracy—rule by death—poses dilemmas. There is the temptation of normal 
states to back thanatocracies because of the imperatives of real politick. Take one 
example: Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s ‘anti-communist’ regime in Nicaragua (1959-
1980)—it killed possibly 50,000 of its own citizens. It took the United States government 
till 1978 to suspend its military aid to the regime. In the 1960s and 1970s, the low point 
of U.S. diplomacy, the American state regularly backed murderous dictators—from 
Suharto in Indonesia through Pinochet in Chile to Marcos in the Philippines. The long-
term damage caused to these societies by tyranny was enormous. Realists, like U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, invoked European theories of international relations 
that relied on despots to contain a greater despotism (Communism). Romantic critics of 
this sordid realism replied with the adoration of Communist despotism. The lesson of the 
twentieth century was that such politics only encourages thanatocracy to do its worst. 
Thanatocratic classes, though, will wage vicious wars to stay in power. So 
withholding support from or overthrowing a thanatocracy requires acute political and 
military judgment. Such political and military judgment rests on a more fundamental 
judgment: at what point can we determine that a state has fallen into the bestiarium?
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Even more difficult is to understand how such regimes can be prevented from emerging 
in the first place. How can we prevent a society sliding into the black hole of entropy and 
death?  
Bertalanffy gave an interesting answer to this question. He had grown up with 
Spengler and Toynbee as early influences. He never lost his affection for their works 
(1975: 74-84). Both thinkers were products of the twentieth-century crisis of European 
civilization. Spengler foresaw the end of the Faustian West. The first six volumes of 
Toynbee’s nine-volume A Study of History were published between 1934 and 1939—as 
Europe plunged into barbarism. Bertalanffy’s answer to the question of how social 
entropy could be avoided was more theoretical rather historical but it was no less cogent 
for that: societies avoid entropy by creating themselves as open systems. Societies that 
import and export matter across boundaries can resist entropy. The flipside of resisting 
entropy is the capacity for systemic organization at ever-higher levels. Open systems 
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typically move in the direction of greater complexity: the greater the negative entropy of 
a social system, the greater the number of parts of the social system that can be integrated 
with each other. Negative entropy, as Bertalanffy observes, can be considered as a 
measure of order and organization (1975: 111). Order is the opposite of chaos. Social 
systems in decline are subject to chaos. Breakdown, disintegration, and dissolution take 
effect through chaos.  
According to Bertalanffy, order is generated when import-export occurs between 
a social system and its environment. This helps us understand why the latter-day 
Chicagoans were right to single out the Eastern Mediterranean as a key to American self-
understanding of civilization. It was not because Athens and Rome and Jerusalem were 
the home of many Great Books—even if they were. It was rather that this liquid region, at 
its greatest, functioned with very high levels of transaction between social system and 
environment. To put this in more concrete terms: the Eastern Mediterranean, for much of 
its history, was a portal space or ecumene. It was dominated by intensive exchanges 
between its great portal cities and littoral city-regions: Piraeus, Ostia, Venice, Genoa, 
Pisa, Constantinople, Alexandria, Rhodes, Antioch, and many others. 
Social systems that are open continually traffic with their environment: what 
could be a better description of a portal? A portal or an ecumene is the space where 
import-export occurs. This space, or this space-time, necessarily corresponds to an open 
system. An open system has weak borders but strong order. How can we understand this 
apparent paradox? There are two ways that a social system creates borders: through rules 
and hierarchies, and through self-organizing order. Rules and hierarchies function to 
create order but they do not institute self-organizing forms of order. Rules and hierarchies 
require permissions and authorities to function, and the systems that they organize suffer 
entropy eventually. Self-organizing order in contrast is abstract and intuitive. It relies not 
on permissions and authorities but on mathematical-geometric principles such as balance, 
homology, oscillation, proportion, and symmetry. Bertalanffy thought that one of 
Spengler’s great insights was that social orders have a mathematical foundation (1975: 
82). ‘Geometric’ principles are crucial to the processes that self-organize the interrelation 
of the parts of a system or the relations between system and environment. The genius of 
such principles, which we see exemplified in the structure of the American Constitution, 
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is that they function quasi-independently of social actors having to make explicit 
decisions or give explicit commands. Rather than organizing a social system exclusively 
on the basis of directions and rules, statuses and rights, in the case of open systems self-
organization—operating via pictorial-aesthetic-mathematical models and schemas—plays 
a crucial role in securing the inter-relationship of social parts.     
Bertalanffy supposed that in a closed system something like rules or hierarchies 
(‘laws of nature’, ‘evolutionary selection’) could create order but that open systems were 
more dynamic because they were self-organizing. The city-states of the Eastern 
Mediterranean were the first to develop theories of how self-organization works through 
proportionality, symmetry, rhythm and similar ‘geometric’ qualities. From these city 
states came a deep understanding of the civilizing forces of grace, balance and 
equilibrium. Taking his cue from Aristotle, Bertalanffy spoke of holistic systems where 
the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The organizing force of the whole is 
neither additive nor is it a function of rules or codes. Rather, qualities like parallelism, 
analogy, allometry,
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 lattice and other kinds of branching and clustering, crystalline and 
meandering patterns provide the organizing force for macroscopic holistic interactions.
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ECUMENE AND THE MIRROR CITY 
The nub of the proceeding argument is this: to understand the nature of portals, 
we need to understand the nature of organization without rules or social hierarchies. We 
can give various names to such organizing forces, not least of all autopoiesis or self-
organization. We can also find many examples of this. When we are dealing with social 
self-organization, some of the most powerful examples occur in portal societies. 
Reflexive self-analysis of the nature of such societies began in the Classical 
Mediterranean.  
In simple terms, the Eastern Mediterranean ecumene is a model of the water-
bound ecumene in general. Even in the modern era of oceanic power, sea regions still 
remain crucial entities. We cannot imagine the idea of modern natural rights, or modern 
civic capitalism, without the contribution of the English-Scottish-Dutch North Sea 
ecumene. In the same way, the economic modernism of twentieth-century Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Shanghai depended on the transactions of the China Seas. We 
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cannot understand the birth of American intellectual life, unless we take into account that 
it emerged in the littoral world of the Eastern Seaboard and the North American Great 
Lakes, with their migrant cities and conjugations of nations and nationalities, and their 
intense rhythms of import-export. This is symbolized neatly by the pragmatism of John 
Dewey and George Herbert Mead—products of the Great Lakes hugging University of 
Michigan and University of Chicago, the antipodes of the littoral worlds of Baltimore and 
Boston from which the work of William James and Charles Sanders Peirce emerged.
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The ecumene is a liquid region. It is a liquid space of intersection between social 
system and environment. Within that region, a particular type of economic, political, and 
cultural interaction is possible. This can be best grasped with the concept of the ‘mirror 
city’ (Blank, 1999: 265-277).  This idea points to the propensity of major cities in a sea 
ecumene to become ‘mirrors’ of each other. The history of interaction between portal 
cities produces porous relationships in language, culture, commerce, and residency. The 
Mediterranean in both the ancient and modern eras produced well-known examples of 
mirror cities—for example, Athens and Alexandria in the Hellenistic era—or ones like 
Marseilles and Algiers today that may fall below the threshold of common awareness but 
nevertheless remain influences on long-term geo-social, geo-political, and geo-
intellectual dynamics.
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 The long-lasting and deep bond between Constantinople and 
Venice in the Byzantine and Ottoman eras is a spectacular example of a mirror 
relationship. To date, interactions across oceanic spaces, even with the relative speed of 
twentieth-century communications and transportation, remain too diffuse to create 
oceanic mirror cities. But, in more compact sea (or sea-like) spaces, relationships of 
mirroring continue to be created—with powerful effects. 
Chicago is a classic example. Historically, Chicago had three mirrors: Toronto, 
which faces Chicago from across the waters of the Great Lakes, Detroit which looks 
northward across the liquid border to Canada, and New York City.
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 Their history of 
linkage is complex, not least in the case of New York. New Yorkers were instrumental in 
financing the development of Chicago in the nineteenth century. Chicago in turn was 
instrumental in getting the Erie Canal built—allowing a continuous fluid passage 
between New York City on the Hudson River and Chicago on the Great Lakes. When the 
Canal was completed in 1825, it turned New York City’s harbor into America’s number 
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one port. The Chicago-New York mirror, with its antipodes and affinities, was echoed 
later on in the twentieth century—by the relationship between the San Francisco-
Oakland-Bay Area and the mirror city-littoral region of the Southern Californian strip-
polis that stretches from Santa Barbara to San Diego-Tijuana. Today, as wealth and 
population moves towards the Gulf of Mexico-Floridian Peninsula region, Houston and 
Miami increasingly play the role of mirror cities.  
The principle assumed here is that thalassic regions are powerful sources of the 
‘rule-less’ order of grace that resists the entropy-death of societies. Of course there are 
examples of thalassic failures. New Orleans is a case in point. The ineffectualness of its 
city officials, the lack of self help, and the urban lawlessness graphically revealed during 
the 2005 Hurricane Katrina was the result of long-term social entropy. In general, 
however, America portals generate more energy than enervation. The dynamics that lifts 
drive and activity above depression and violence can be described in the following terms: 
thalassian circumstances create a demand for seaports (and airports and rail ports). Portal 
cities become nodal points for the contact, transmission, exchange, transformation, and 
finally supersession of rules and roles, hierarchies and statuses, cultures and worldviews. 
These are places known especially for their diaspora, exiles, traders, pilgrims, explorers, 
migrants, ‘circulating’ administrators, ‘journeymen’, and traveling artists. Portals 
encourage communication across cultures and customs. The liquid space of the ecumene 
is a medium for replacing norms and rules, social hierarchies and chains of command. If 
this was the case historically in classical antiquity, then the modern age of civic 
capitalism, if anything, intensified this condition. As sea regions came to be incorporated 
into the global system of oceanic power—and, correspondingly, as the United States 
developed on the unprecedented foundation of multiple sea  (and sea-like) regions—this 
had the effect of compounding the concentration of habits, cultures, stories and 
worldviews in the liquid spaces of portal cities (Murphy, 2003). 
Park, Mumford, Arendt, Voegelin, and Strauss all treated the city as a suggestive 
model for American power and civilization. Their conceptualizations of this drew on a 
systemic analogy with the classic maritime polis. This was a good analogy. Ancient 
Athens was a point of interaction for Greeks from Southern Italy, Attica, and Asia Minor. 
Later, Alexandria brought Jews and Greeks together, Rome synthesized Latin and Greek 
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cultures, and Antioch melded Jews and Gentiles into Christians. This was enabled by 
open systems of port cities and liquid regions. What made this possible was not simply 
the pasting of bits and pieces of culture and habits together. That is not civilization. 
Civilization assumes coherent meaning; coherent meaning assumes systemic pattern; 
systemic pattern assumes an ordering principle. That is really what open systems or 
portals do: they are the medium through which order is generated. Order is generated 
when societies and cultures meet—when Greek city meets Greek city, Dorian meets 
Ionian, Greek meets Roman, Hellenized Jew meets Orthodox Jew, Jew meets Gentile, 
Venetian meets Byzantine, Ottoman Greek meets Ottoman Turk—under certain 
conditions. If we live in a place where there is traffic between different normative 
cultures and where there is an ecumenical ‘reason of grace’ that becomes a container all 
of them, then a common order is possible. The city—from Athens to Venice to 
Chicago—is a way of thinking about how such a thing is possible. The great portal city is 
both the symbol and the embodiment of an ecumenical order. 
How does an ecumene create order? It does so by triggering negative entropy. To 
do this requires self-organizing capacity. Another term for this is pneumatic spirit. This 
simply means that ecumenical order is created not by instituting new hierarchies or new 
rules, new norms or new statuses, but by other kinds of media. Without question, virtue 
ethics and divine commandments, religious laws and secular legislation, liberal rights and 
libertarian permissions are media from which societies emerge. But they are not the only 
kinds of media. There are also non-linguistic visual, tactile, and kinetic media, 
mathematical-geometric and design media. These are form-creating media. Norms and 
rules, hierarchies and statuses employed on their own create closed systems. Designing 
media—media that are architectonic—create open systems (Murphy, 2001c, 2005a). 
We see this luminously represented in great portal cities at their height. They 
habitually exhibit a plastic genius for the organization of matter. They are brilliant 
builders of churches, mosques, universities, hotels, stock exchanges, stations, offices, and 
the rest. Such building is the outward expression of spirit (pneuma). Spirit is the great 
antagonist of entropy. Spirit sweeps entropy aside. Spirit is negative entropy. Entropic 
social systems lose their capacity to organize matter. Spirit is exactly this capacity. One 
of the basic reasons for the loss of spiritual capacity is that norms and rules, statuses and 
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hierarchies—no matter how sophisticated—on their own create non-porous boundaries 
between a social system and its environment.  
The consequences of this are two-fold. Matter flowing between a social system 
and its outside is reduced. The obverse of this is that rules and hierarchies create inward-
looking and de-spirited order. The over-all effect is a dampening of human activity.
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Depression, de-moralization, and disintegration follow. To overcome this, an order that 
ensures porous boundaries is necessary. This order bridges between system and 
environment. It does this not by rules and hierarchies but by equilibrium, balance, 
symmetry, and other architectonic forms. It organizes system and environment relations 
through patterns that are self-organizing. Such patterns can be extended in unpredictable 
or spontaneous ways, and in ways that don’t necessarily require explicit authorization. 
This kind of order is pneumatic.
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 Another word for it is sacred order—self-organizing 
order that invests human life, and societies in history, with meaning and coherence.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
  A July 2004 search on the English language title keyword phrase ‘Western Civilization’ in 
Harvard University’s Hollis library catalogue shows something of the history of the phrase. The first 
appearance of ‘Western Civilization’ as a book title was in 1868 (The influences of western civilization in 
China). This was followed by a small handful of titles on Western influence in East Asia, and then in 1898 
the pace picks up (beginning with Cunningham’s An essay on western civilization in its economic aspects), 
and there-after on average there is a title per year till 1947. This is then followed by an explosion of titles—
e.g. 6 in 1948, 9 in 1951, 6 in 1960, 8 in 1964, and onwards at this rate till 2004.   
2
  The empire of Charlemagne (742-814) incorporated what today are Switzerland, France, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands, plus half of Italy and Germany, and parts of Austria and Spain. 
3
  . It was also the basis for a program of civic education aimed at migrants from the margins of 
Europe, from its Eastern and Southern rims, pouring into New York and other great American cities 
(Carnochan, 1993). The migrants had allegiances that were either uncertain or simply threatening to 
America’s Anglo-Protestant majority. Western Civilization was an inclusive enough concept to fudge the 
distinctions between Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and even (at a stretch) Orthodox heritages. It also 
instinctively bridged between what had been the historic predominance of migration to America from the 
Northwest European littoral (Anglo, Scottish, Irish, Dutch, Nordic) periphery and the swell of migration 
from Continental Europe as well as from Europe’s Southern littoral. 
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4
  From 1943 until he retired in 1974 Hutchins was chairman of the Board of Editors of 
Encyclopædia Britannica. He served as editor in chief of the 54-volume Great Books of the Western World, 
published from 1952. 
5
  For a critical though wry account of the salvos by the American higher educated against ‘Western 
Civ’, see Allan Bloom (1987). Of course, the irony was that Bloom himself was by no means an enthusiast 
for much of what Europe in the modern age had produced—i.e. nihilism. Bloom saw himself as a defender 
of American common sense against the philosophies of Heidegger and Nietzsche and Rousseau in 
particular. This did not stop him from loving the gourmand life of Paris. For a portrait of the sybaritic 
Bloom in Paris, see Bellow (2000).   
6
  A useful point of comparison is the 300,000 Union soldiers who died in the American Civil War.  
7
  In 1821, John Quincy Adams put it in these terms: ‘America, with the same voice which spoke 
herself into existence as a nation, proclaimed to mankind the inextinguishable rights of human nature, and 
the only lawful foundations of government… But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy…’ 
See Weeks (1996: 62).  
8
  Charles Beard in the 1920s developed the mature form of the national liberal view, which painted 
America overseas as an inveterate imperialist. William Appleman Williams (1959, 1969) recapitulated this 
view in a vaguely Marxist version. More recently it was re-done in an institutionalist guise by Chalmers 
Johnson (2004). On Beard’s work, see Noble (1985), Benson (1980 [1960]). On American exceptionalism, 
see Lipset (1996), Glaser and Wellenreuther (2002), Hietala (2003), Madsen (1998), Gutfeld (2002). 
9
  Winston Churchill (2004 [1946]). Britain’s membership of the EEC, EC, and EU made no 
difference to the template that Churchill envisaged—of a Britain that had close economic and military 
relations with Europe but a strategic relationship based on common values with the United States. On his 
subtle mix, see Jenkins (2002). 
10
  This was already observed by Emerson. See his ‘English Traits’ (1856) in Bode & Cowley (1981: 
423).  
11
  This echoes British ties to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Australia. 
12
  Between 1976 and 1985, a quarter of all U.S. economic and military aid went to Israel. This was 
equivalent to 13 percent of the Israeli gross national income. See Ferguson (2004: 113).  
13
  There is no reason that other examples of such order can’t and won’t appear in history. But such 
breakthroughs are rare. 
14
  On the appearance of the culture of death in the late Renaissance and early Barqoue, see Carroll 
(2004/1993). On the Baroque as an entropic crisis-obsessed culture, see Peter Murphy (2001: 193-220); on 
the lethal trajectory of Central European Romanticism, see Murphy and Roberts (2004). 
15
  The same cannot be said for Japan in the 1930s, or Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan in the 2000s, where the mix of local religion and imported European nihilism created deadly 
political movements. In both cases, the only resistance to this was Anglo-American and from the settler 
societies.   
16
  A classic example of the later was Spain’s conquest of the Americas. 
17
  See especially Kirk (1974). 
18
  Parsons (1949). 
19
  Heidegger, Basic Concepts (1998: 42-65). Basic Concepts is a lecture series Heidegger gave in the 
winter semester of 1941. 
20
  In lectures between 1936 and 1940, and again in 1943. 
21
  Eric Voegelin made the point that what counted about the metaphysics of Plato was not ‘Platonic 
philosophy’ or ‘doctrine’, but Plato’s resistance to the disorder of the surrounding society and his effort to 
restore the order of Hellenic civilization through the love of wisdom. See Voegelin (1957: 5).  
22
  See, for example, Leo Strauss (1993: 129; 1989: 88). 
23
  One of the rare European intellectuals to have taken up this viewpoint is Agnes Heller, who in 
multiple works insisted that ‘life’ and ‘freedom’ were the necessary axioms of any modernity that was not 
self-destructive.  
24
  See, e.g., Mumford (1961). 
25
  One of the better known, not to say notorious, products of this Neo-Thomism was the work of the 
Toronto savant Marshall McLuhan. McLuhan was the most mercurial intellect of the Great Lakes ecumene, 
and is interesting for his ability to re-work what was at heart a Catholic worldview into an explanation and 
diagnosis of broadcast communication. He converted to Catholicism in 1937. 
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26
  Emerson (1959). 
27
  Croly (1909). The kudos heaped upon this work is simply unintelligible to a non-American. See, 
for example, Rorty’s encomium in Achieving Our Country (1998: 46-49). 
28
  Hutchins (1936). See his comments on Aristotle (pp. 56, 68, 81, 84, 97, 98, 103, 119), Aquinas 
(pp. 63, 96), Newman (pp. 63, 103), Plato (pp. 78, 81, 84). 
29
  Or as the quip went, at the University of Chicago Jewish professors taught Catholic thought to 
Protestant students. 
30
  He did this with the historian John U. Nef, the economist Frank Knight, and the anthropologist 
Robert Redfield.  
31
  This concentration of mercurial talent is unlikely to be repeated. Even distinguished later 
Committee alumnus like Allan Bloom, Paul Ricoeur, Charles Rosen, and Leszek Kolakowski don’t quite 
measure up to Chicago’s great ‘Attic’ moment. Mainstays of the Committee through its great period 
included the classicist and translator David Grene and the sociologist Edward Shils. 
32
  When migrants from Eastern and Southern Europe first arrived in the United States in the 1870s 
and 1880s, the dominant Catholic theology had been a sentimental gothic-romanticism that looked back to 
an idealized medieval world. However, an anti-romantic Thomism emerged in reaction to this at the turn of 
the twentieth century. Etienne Gilson—at Toronto— and Jacques Maritain were representative figures. Leo 
XIII’s 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris, calling on the Church to study St. Thomas, triggered the movement. 
Fordham University (in New York City) and St. Louis University were important Neo-Thomist centers. 
The Modern Schoolman (1925), Thought (1926), and The New Scholasticism (1927) were its chief journals. 
(Gleason: 14-29, 113-114, 140-142, 148, 167.) The great modernist architect, Mies van der Rohe, was one 
of the fellow travelers of this Neo-Thomism. Based in Chicago, Mies developed one of the most influential 
international architectural practices in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s. (Murphy & Roberts, 137-144).  
33
  Unorthodox Neo-Thomisms were conceivable, though. A left-field case was that of Marshall 
McLuhan (1911-1980). A Catholic convert, McLuhan spent a teaching career at the Jesuit and Thomist-
dominated St. Louis University and at St. Michael’s College at the University of Toronto. McLuhan 
blended an eccentric Catholicism with the brilliant theories about media dreamed up by his older, Baptist-
raised, Toronto colleague Harold Innis (1894-1952). Gilson, a colleague of McLuhan’s at Toronto, could 
not make sense of McLuhan’s tangential Catholicism. Innis’ chief insight was that a wide and interesting 
range of media—from the plastic media of architecture to the network media of roads and railways—were 
as decisive in human history as texts. The medium was the message, as McLuhan later glossed. Though 
both were raised on the Canadian plains, Innis was an intellectual product of Chicago in the same way that 
McLuhan was of St. Louis. Both were in those places for relatively short times—Innis to do his PhD. in 
Economics at the University of Chicago, McLuhan as a junior professor in St. Louis (1937-1946). Innis 
received his Ph.D. degree when Robert Park and George Herbert Mead were both teaching at Chicago. 
34
  To compound the irony, American Protestant evangelicals rejected texts and embraced 
dramaturgy, rhetoric and music.   
35
  The twentieth-century iteration of Thomism lost its impetus in the 1960s. Romantic-liberationist 
currents pushed it aside. An ambitious version of Catholic Aristotelianism was to appear later in United 
States in the 1980s—with the publication of works by the relocated Scottish Marxist, Alasdair MacIntyre. 
These works self-consciously agonized the Enlightenment tradition by setting against it the rich history of 
Aristotelian Christian thought. This attempt to agonize Enlightenment liberalism had its limits. For one 
thing, it was a very bookish reading of history. It replicated the bias of the Chicago Encyclopaedists that 
‘the West’ or ‘Civilization’ was a chain of texts—each one supplementing texts that had come before. The 
equation of text and ‘meaning in history’ was problematic. Painting, sculpture, architecture, urbanism, 
design, and performance had a curiously peripheral role in this definition of civilization. 
36
  Murphy (2001: 11-38). 
37
  Clarke (1996). See especially Clarke’s comments, pp. 48-49 and Ibana’s, p. 91.  
38
  In a remark to James Monroe in 1801, Jefferson expounded his view: ‘However our present 
interests may restrain us within our limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our 
rapid multiplication will expand it beyond those limits, & cover the whole northern if not the southern 
continent, with people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws…’ See 
Alstyne (1974: 87).  
39
  The geopolitical dominance of these states was based on naval power. The both lacked the 
tradition of large standing armies that could overwhelm state and society.  
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40
  The term seedbed, used of the Eastern Mediterranean, is Talcott Parson’s (1966). 
41
  Voegelin was born in the Rhine ecumene, in Colonge in 1901, and spent three years on a 
Rockefeller scholarship in the United States (1924-1926), after which he wrote On the Form of the 
American Mind (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995). In 1938 he returned to the U.S., in 
flight from Nazism. He was professor at Louisiana State University (1942-1958), moving to Munich in 
1958, and returning to the United States in 1969 to Stanford University.  
42
  Voegelin (1952). The Walgreen Lectures were probably the greatest lecture series in history. Yves 
R. Simon presented them in 1948, Leo Strauss in 1949, Voegelin in 1951, Robert Dahl in 1953, and Arendt 
in 1956. They were the basis for Simon’s Philosophy of Democratic Government, Strauss’ Natural Right 
and History, Dahl’s A Preface to Democratic Theory, and Arendt’s The Human Condition.   
43
  Innis’ friendship with his Toronto classics colleague Charles Cochrane was an important influence 
in this respect. See Cochrane (1957).  
44
  Sir Alfred Zimmern’s 1911 study The Greek Commonwealth was also an early influence. 
Zimmern (1879-1957) was a classicist who became the first professor of international relations at the 
University of Wales.  
45
  Like Voegelin before him, he was a Rockefeller Fellow. 
46
  To cite just one of many other cases: Between 1989 and 1999, the pairing of General Omar al-
Bashir and the Sorbonne-educated theological hard-liner Hassan al-Turabi were responsible for the deaths 
of some one-and-a-half million of Sudan’s animist-Christian black African population.  In 1994-1996, 
Osama bin Laden had his base of operations in the Sudan. Nothing changes. The British fought the earliest 
iterations of this war in Egypt and the Sudan in the 1880s and 1890s—protecting Coptic, African, and 
Greek Christians and others from Mahdi-inspired slaughter and enslavement.  
47
  Those—like Hobsbawm (1994)—who thought the twentieth century to be defined by its 
‘shortness’ were wrong. The age of extremes began well before 1914 and has continued unabated since 
1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. While it may have been psychologically tempting to draw a 
curtain on the horrors of the twentieth century once the disgraceful Soviet regime expired, the same horrors 
were promptly repeated on Europe’s door-step, in the Balkans, through the 1990s. The European response 
to Balkan genocide was to wring hands, negotiate with a recalcitrant power, or do nothing. It was the 
Americans who took military action and ended the plunge into barbarism.  
48
  On the political theory of the beastiarium, see Feher and Heller (1987). 
49
  Denotes the growth of a part of a body at a different rate from that of the body as a whole. 
50
  See, for example, ‘Evolution: Chance or Law’ in 1975: 137-148. 
51
  It should not surprise us either that the longest term of employment that the Peirce had in his 
difficult life was with the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.   
52
  Blank (1999) puts it thus: ‘The flood of European immigrants into Algiers during the colonial 
period was reflected by a reverse flow of Algerians into Marseilles in the decades after World war II. North 
African enclaves in the European city mirror European enclaves in the North African city. In some 
neighborhoods of Marseilles, it is difficult to tell whether one is Europe or North Africa. Before 
independence, the same could be said of Algiers.’ On the mirror relationship between Marseilles and 
Algiers, see Murphy, 2005b. 
53
  The mirror of Chicago and Toronto is very apparent in the life of mind. As a counter-point to 
Dewey, Arendt, Strauss, Hayek, and McNeill at Chicago, we have Harold Innis, Eric Havelock, Marshall 
McLuhan, and Jane Jacobs at Toronto. For the work of the Toronto intellectuals, see: Innis (1950, 1951), 
McLuhan (1962), Havelock (1957, 1963, 1982), Jacobs (1970, 1984). On Innis and McLuhan’s life and 
work, see Heyer (1998), chapters 8 and 9. For Innis, Acland and Buxton (1999), Havelock (1982), Connor 
(2003); On McLuhan, see Terrence (1997). 
54
  Or as Innis put it in his notebooks (1947-1948): ‘Closed systems result of written tradition, i.e. 
Spengler – Toynbee. Totalitarian states – belief in power of written word of government’ (1980: 123).  
55
  For further discussion of the nature of pneumatic order, see Voegelin (1989), Carroll (2001), and 
Murphy (2001b).  
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